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-, The LegacyofUK Tax Concepts in Canadian Income
Tax-Law'
BENJAMIN ALARIE AND DAVID G. DUFF'"
Abstract
This article examines a specific category oflegal transfers between the United Kingdom and
Canada; namely, the legacy ofUK tax concepts in Canadian income tax law. Two main areas
areconsidered where, in ourview, thisinfluence hasbeen mostprofound: (i) theconcept ofincome
deployed for Canadian tax purposes; and (ii) judicial approaches to statutory interpretation
and tax avoidance. Although the rules and concepts that Canadian courts and legislatures have
adopted in each ofthese areas have necessarily evolved over time, the path ofthis evolution
as well as current approaches reflect the enduring influence of UK tax concepts on Canadian
income tax law. The first substantive section examines the structure and concept ofincome in
Canadian tax law, linking its origins and development to the globaland schedular taxes that
were adopted in the United Kingdom in 1799 and 1803, and to the source and trust concepts
that UK courts have employed to interpret the meaning ofincome for tax purposes. The next
section. considers judicial approaches to the interpretation oftax statutes and tax avoidance in
Canada, tracing the origins ofa strictconstruction approach to interpretation and aformalistic
approach to the characterisation oftransactions and relationships to earlyjudicial decisions in
the UK, and explaining the influence ofthis traditionalapproach onsubsequent legislative and
judicial developments. Thefinal section concludes that the traditionalapproach endures, albeit
uneasily, in Canadian income tax law in the continuing emphasis on textual interpretation
of tax legislation and in the formalist application of the general anti-avoidance rule hy the
SupremeCourtofCanada.
Introduction
AMONG legal sociologists, it is often argued that so-called "legal transplants" in which
legal rules are transferred from one jurisdiction to another are virtually impossible.1
To the-extent that legal rules are given concrete meaning within the social and legal
context in which they are interpreted and applied, this observation is necessarily true,
but also somewhat trite. While the metaphor ofa legal "transplant" may be exaggerated.t
• Benjamin Alarie, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University ofToronto; Senior Fellow, Monash
University Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute. David G. Duff, Associate Professor, Faculty
ofLaw, University ofToronto; International Research Fellow, Oxford University Centre for Business
Taxation; Senior Fellow, Monash University Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute.
1 See, e.g. P. Legrand, "What 'Legal Transplants'?" in Adapting LegalCultures (D. Nelken and]. Feest
(eds), Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) at 55, criticising A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approachto
Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1974).
2 See, e.g. D. Nelken, "Legal Transplants and Beyond: OfDisciplines and Metaphors" in Comparative
;, Law in the 21stCentury (A. Harding and E. Omeli (eds), Kluwer Academic Publishers, London, 2002)
at 19. '
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suggesting that the transplanted legal rule remains largely intact within the host -legal
systemr' the phenomenon of legal transfers is well-established ·in comparative legal
scholarship and central to the categorisation of legal traditions or families with common
characteristics and approaches.t Where legal rules and concepts are transferred 'between
jurisdictions with similar legal traditions and socio-economic characteristics, moreover,
one might expect a strong resemblance between the transferred rule or concept and its
original version. This is particularly so for legal transfers between the .United Kingdom
-and a developed Commonwealth country like Canada, where the legal system is generally
derived from UK sources.i appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy -Council
existed until 1949,6 and a shared legal culture is fostered by educational and professional
exchanges and graduate education in the United Kingdom.7
It would be impossible in an article such as this to do justice to the multitude of UK
tax concepts that have influenced .Canadian income tax law.8 Nevertheless, it ispossible
to show I that UK tax concepts have had considerable influence in the structure and
development of Canadian income tax law, affecting Canadian tax law's conceptof income
as well as judicial approaches to the interpretation of tax statutes and to tax avoidance.
With respect to the concept of income, Canadian courts have been influenced' byUk,
source and trust concepts ofincome as well as the schedular nature of the UK income tax,
which has significantly affected Canadian judicial decisions notwithstanding the global
character of the Canadian income tax. In response to judicial decisions based on these
UK tax concepts, the federal Income Tax Act (ITA) has often been amended to extend
the breadth of the tax. These amendments, like the judicial decisions they have reversed,
as well as subsequent judicial decisions in which, they have been considered, remain as
an enduring legacy of UK tax concepts in Canadian income tax law. Although the rules
and concepts. that Canadian courts and legislatures have:adopted have necessarily evolved
over time, as they have in the United Kingdom itself, the path.of this evolution as well as
current approaches reflect the complex interplay of UK tax concepts and those of.other
jurisdictions both directly and indirectly on Canadian income: taxlaw," . . . .' ~, .. -.
3 On the other hand, even a metaphor of a "transplant" implies some adaptation as the transplant may
fail ifit is rejected by the host. See Nelken, fu.2 at 27. . .' .
4- See generally K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law (T. Weirtrans., 3rd rev. ed.,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998). .
5 The major exception to this pattern is the private law ofQuebec, which is civilian.
6 Cases that were already undenvay at the time that appeals to theJCPC were abolished ,v~re permitted
to appeal, which explains why the practice of appealing to the JCPC continued into the mid-1950s.
See, e.g. MNR u AnacondaAmericanBrassLtd [1955] CTC 311; 55 DTC 1220, PC.
7 This last factor has waned over the last 30 years as Canadian-trained graduate students in laware now
more likely to study in the United States than the United Kingdom. '
8 Consider as indirect evidence Peter Harris's historical work oil income taxes in common law
jurisdictions. The treatment Harris gives to income tax from the inception to 1820 runs to 514 pages.
See P. Harris, Income Tax ;11 Common Law Jurisdictions: From the Origins to 1820 (CUI?, Cambridge,
2006). On the evolvingapproach of the UK.courts to interpretation and tax avoidance, seeJ~ Freedman,
"Interpreting Tax Statues: Tax Avoidance and the-Intention ofParliament" (2007) 123 LQR 52.
9 To the extent that Canadian courts and legislatures draw on tax concepts from other jurisdictions as
well as the United Kingdom (for example, the United States, from which Canada derived its controlled
foreign corporation rules), it is possible to speak of a convergence in tax systems, particularly among
developed countries. Notwithstanding- this convergence, marked distinctions among different legal
families remain, resulting in continuing affinities in taxconcepts among jurisdictions' belonging to
the same legal family. For useful discussions regarding convergence among tax systems as well as
2i9
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With.respect to interpretation and tax avoidance, Canadian courts originally adopted
the strict and literal approach that UK. courts embraced from the mid-nineteenth century
to .the 1970s as well as the formalist approach to. the characterisation. of transactions
and legal relationships that the House -of Lords adopted in the Duke of Westminster
case.IO.Although Canadian courts began to depart from this approach in the 1980s,. the
legacy of strict and literal interpretation and formalistic characterisation endures inthe
detailed and prolix manner in which income tax legislation is drafted, the 'multitude of
provisions designed to plug gaps created by restrictive judicial interpretations; the variety
of-specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs) designed to limit avoidance opportunities, and
the introduction in 1988 ofa statutory general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR)..
Despite the Supreme Court of Canada's emphasis during the 1980s and .early 1990s
on purposive interpretation and substantive characterisation, moreover, the traditional
judicial approach resurfaced from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s as the Supreme .Court
of Canada adopted a more literal interpretative approach and a more formalist approach
to the characterisation of transactions. and relationships for tax purposes. While several
more recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions suggest a greater willingness to interpret
tax provisions in light of their context and purpose, the traditional 'approach endures
in a continuing emphasis on textual interpretation of tax legislation and ·in a formalist
approach to the application of the GAAR that seeks to synthesise the traditional Duke of
Westminster principle with the antithetical approach exemplified by the GAAR.
The structure and concept of income in Canadian income tax law
Canada's federal income tax was.first enacted in 1917~ with the declared purpose ofhelping
fund the country's participation-in the First World War .11 Although-some provinces had
enacted their own income taxes before this date,12 and all provinces currently levy income
taxes under their constitutional power to' make laws relating to "Direct Taxation within
the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.I'P the federal
government assumed a dominant role in: Canadian income taxation during the: Second
World War and has retained it ever since through tax collection agreements under. which
the federal government is prepared to collect provincial income tax on each province's
differences among different families of tax systems, see V. Thuronyi, Comparatiue T(J,>; Lam (Kluwer
Law International, The Hague, 2003)at 15 and 23. .
IOIRC v Duke ofWestIninster 19 TC 490; [1936] AC 1. '.
11 Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1917, c. 28. For a provocative account of the introduction of the Canadian
income tax, arguing that it was,"a purely political act . . . by the government of the day to attract
candidates and votes in a crucial wartime election" see R. Krever, "The Origin of FederalIncome
Taxation in Canada',' (1981) 3 Canadian Taxation 170~t 171. - . '... ..
12 British Columbia introduced a provincial personal income tax in ,1876 and Prince Edward Island did
so in 1894. E. H. Smith, Federal-Proumcial Tax Sharing and Centralized Ta..t· Collection ill Canada
(Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 1998) at 8. ._. . . '
13 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3. s.92(2) (UK). According tos.9J(3) ofthe Constitution
Act, 1867, the federal government may make laws relating to "The raising of Money by any Mode
or System of Taxation." As a result, both federal and provincial governments have the constitutional
authority to levy income.taxes. See G. V. LaForest, TheAllocation ofTaxing Power Underthe Canadian
Constitution (2nd ed., Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, J981).
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behalf provided that the province adopts the same definition of taxable income as the
federal legislation. 14
As a former 'colony, with significant legal and cultural connections to" the United
Kingdom, it is not surprising that Canada might look to UK legislation when drafting
its first federal income. tax. There, the income tax applied separately to five .different
types ofincome-s-income from lands derived by owners (Schedule A), income from lands
derived by occupiers (Schedule B), annuities and dividends paid on government securities
(Schedule C), annual profits and gains from property, professions, trades, employments
and vocations (Schedule D), and income from public offices and employments (Schedule
E}---reflecting the schedular structure ofAddington's 1803income tax, which was repealed
in 1816 but reinstated in 1842.15 Before Addington, however, Pitt's 1799 income tax had
applied on a global basis to "all income" from various sources-lands, tenements and
hereditaments (Cases 1-14), trades, professions, offices, pensions, stipends, employments
and vocations (Case 15), offices, pensions, stipends, annuities, interest, .rent or similar
payments including annuities and dividends paid on governmentsecurities (Case 16),
income arising outside Great Britain (Cases 17-18), and "any income. not falling under
the above heads" (Case 19).16
Notwithstanding significant differences in the structure of these taxes, both share a
similar concept of income in the form of various productive sources from which income
is derived, such as property, professions, trades, employments, vocations, and offices.I?
Based on prevailing economic theories' at the time, this source concept of income bears' "a
striking resemblance to the account providedby Adam Smith in The Wealth ofNations, 18
who defined income in terms of four productive sources: wages of labour, trading profits,
interest on financial capital, and rent of land. 19 Together with this source concept, UK
14 For a detailed discussion of these tax collection agreements, see Smith, fn.IZ at 'Chs 9-12. Each
province (except Quebec) has entered into a tax collection agreement with the federal govemnient for
personal income taxes. ' " -
15 See A. Likhovski, "A Map ofSociety: Defining Income in British, British Colonial and American Tax
Legislation" [2005] BTR 158 at 163. For a detailed explanation of Addington's 1803 income tax, see
P. E. Soos, The OriginsofTaxation at Source ill England (IBFD Publications BV, Amsterdam, 1997)
at 152. See also M. Daunton, "What is Income?" in Studies ill the History ofTax Law G. Tiley (ed),
Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 3.
16 An Act to Repeal the Duties Imposed by an Act, Made in the Last Session ofParliament, for Granting
and Aid and Contribution for the Prosecution of the War, and to Make More Effectual Provision for
the Like Purpose, by Granting Certain Duties upon Income, in Lieu of the' Said Duties, 39 Geo,
3, c.l3. For an excellent summary of the 1799 income tax, see Soos, fn.15 at 147-52. For various
reasons, Pitt's tax was riot "well received, and the tax was repealed in 1802. See Likhovski, fn.If
at 163 (explaining that merchants objected to the inspection of their books and records arid to the
disclosure of their total income for the year); and Daunton, fn.15 at 4 (observing that compliance and
collection were more difficult Under Pitt's global approach than Addington's schedular tax-which was
administered through deductions at source).
17· On the distinction between the "definitional structure" ofan income tax and the "concept ofincome"
that it employs, see Thuronyi, fn.9 at233~35." .
18 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of tile Wealth ofNations, 1776 (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976).
19 See Smith, fn.18 at 59 (Bk I, Ch. VI): "Whoever derives his revenue. from a fund which is his own,
must draw it either from his labour, from his stock, or from his land. The revenue derived froin labour
is called wages. That derived from stock, by the person who manages or employs it, is called profit.
That derived from it by the person who does not employ it himself but lends it to another, is caned
the interest or the use of money.... The revenue which proceeds altogether from hind, is called rent,
231
[2008] BTR: No.3 © SWEET& MAX\VELL AND coNTRmUTORs 2008
BRITISH, TAX REVIEW
courts traditionallyinterpreted the concept of income according to trust law.distinctions
between capital and income, characterising capital gains and other non-recurring revenues
like gifts and windfalls as non-taxable receipts rather than income from a souIce.~P On
this' basis, as Rowlatt J. declared in Ryall v Hoare:
"First, anything in the nature of capital accretion is excluded as being outside the
scope and meaning ofthese Acts confirmed by the usage ofa century. For this reason,
a casual profit made' on an Isolated purchase 'and' sale, unless merged with similar
transactions in the carrying on of a trade or business is not liable to, tax. "Profits or
gains" in Case 6 referto the interest or fruit as opposed to the principal or root of the
tree. The second class of cases to be excluded consists of gifts and receipts whether
the emolument is from a gift intervivos or by will or from finding an article of value
or from winning a bet. All these cases must be ruled out because they are 'not profits
, or gains at all.,,21 ' , ' '
While the former receipts were characterised as, non-taxable capital' gains from the
realisation of an investment, the latter were characterised as non-taxable gains from the
transfer of property rather than the creation ofnew wealth. 22
In addition to the United Kingdom, Canadian drafters might also have looked to the
United States, which enacted the predecessor to its current income tax only-four years
earlier, in 1913.23 According to a revised version of this legislation enacted in, 1916, the
"net income ofa taxable person" was defined to include; '
"gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensationfor personal
# service . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions,
vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether
real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property;
also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business
carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any,source
whatever. ,,24 :
Like Pitt's 1799 income tax, this income tax was global in structure" applying to a
taxpayer's "gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." In' contrast
to the United Kingdom, however, the concept of income contained in this definition is
arguably broader than the source and trust concepts adopted by.JJK courts, including
not only income from various productive s~urces such as "professions, vocations, ,trades
and belongs to the landlord. . . . 'All taxes, and all the revenue which is founded upon them . . . are
ultimately derived from some one or other of those three original sources of revenue, 'and' are paid
either immediately or mediately from the wages of labour, the profits ofstock, or the rent of land."
20 J. Tiley, Revell~e Law (4th ed., Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) .at 131. On the significance of the
trust concept of income for the taxation of capital gains, see L. H. Seltzer, "Evolution of the Special
Status of Capital Gains Under the Income Tax" (1950) 3 Nat'} Tax J~ .18. As, Tiley, explains (at
'l32) the distinction between capital and income may also be linked to the economic thought of
,_Adam Smith, who distinguished between circulating capital which yields recurring profits through
successive exchanges and fixed capital which yields a profit "without changing masters, or circulating
any further." See Smith, fn.l S at 295 (Bk II, Ch.1). ' .
21 Ryall v Hoare [1923] 2 KB 447 at 454, KB. '
; 22 'See the discussion in Bellingham v Canada [1996] 1 CTC 187; [1995] 96 DTC 6075, FCA.
-. 23 RevenueAct of ~9~3, 38 Stat. 166 (1913). '
24 Revenue Act of 1916,39 Stat. 758 (1916).
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and businesses," but also income derived in various forms such.as "salaries, wages, or
compensation for personal service," as well as "gains" and "profits" more .generally. ~
the context of this statutory definition, the US Supreme Court held that' the, US income
tax applies to realised capital gains,25 gifts and' inheritances,26 .and other_non-recurring
receipts such as punitive damages.27 In Commissioner v Glenshato Glass 'Co,28 moreover,
the ,Court affirmed a different concept of income than the UK source and trust. concepts,
explaining that punitive damages were taxable as "undeniable,accessions to wealth, . .
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion. ,,29 In contrast to the source and trust
concepts of income, therefore, the US courts 'developed an accessions concept of income.
Whatever the actual references consulted by the drafters of the Canada's first federal
income tax, the definition of income in this legislation appears to reflect both English and
American influences. According to subsection 3(1) of the Income War Tax Act (iWTA),
income was defined as:
"the annual net profit or gain or gratuity .'. . received by a person from any office
or employment, or from any profession or calling or from any trade, manufacture or
business. . . the interest, dividends or profits. . . received from money. . . or from
stocks, or from any other investment, ... ·and also the annual profit or gain froin
any other source. ,,30
Like the US income tax and Pitt's 1799 income tax, therefore, the IWTA adopted a global
approach to the definition of income, including all net profits Of 'gains from "any .'., .
source." Like the UK income taxes, the IWTA also employed a source concept ,ofincome,
defining income as profits, gains or gratuities from various productive .sources such
as offices, employments, professions, callings, trades, manufactures, businesses, money, .
stocks or other investments. These two features have endured through subsequent
amendments to the federal income tax, which have consistently included a taxpayer's
income from all sources inside and outside Canada, 'while simultaneously identifying
specific sources of income "without restricting the generality" of the inclusion ofincome
from all sources.l! Since 1948, the main sources of income that have been specified for
25 Eisner v MaCOl1zber (1920) 252 US 189.'Although the court held, that the US Revenue Act of 1916
applied to capital gains, the decision also held that the concept of income suggested by the 16th
amendment to the US Constitution and employed in the Act did not apply to accrued gains that had
not been realised through the sale or other disposition of the properly. For a detailed account of this
decision and its impact on the structure of the US income tax, see M. Kornhauser, "The Story of
Macol1zber: The Continuing Legacy of Realization", in Tax Stories:An In-Depth Look at Tell Leading
FederalIncome Tax Cases (P. Caron (ed.), Foundation Press, New York, 2003) at 53.
. 26 Irwin v Cavit (1925) 268 US 161. Although the US income tax specifically excludes "property
acquired by gift, bequest or descent," the Court held that this exemption did not apply to the bequest
of an income interest in a trust.
27 Commissioner v Glenshaw GlassCo (1955) 348 US 425.
28 Commissioner u Glenshaw GlassCo (1955) 348 US 425. . .
29 Commissioner u GlenshawGlassCo(1955) 348 US 425 at431. For a detailed account of this decision and
its impact on the concept of income in the US income tax, seeJ.M. Dodge, "The Story of Glenshaw
Glass: Towards a Modem Concept of Gross Income", in Caron (ed.), fn.25 at 15.
30 S.C. 1917, c.28.
31 See Income Tax Act, S.C. 1948, c.52, s.3 (ITA 1948); Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.148, s.3 (as
amended) (ITA 1952); and Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71, c. 63, para.3(a); and Income Tax Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c.l (5th Supp.) (as amended) (ITA).
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this purpose are businesses, properties, offices 'and employments.V "though these have
also been supplemented by other categories of income such as pensions 'and' alimony,33
and (since 1972) taxable' capital gains. 34'As a general rule, these categories of income are
subject to 3: detailed 'set ofcomputational rules defined by the federal income tax statute.35
Since 1960, the computational rules for computing a taxpayer's incomefrom eachsource
have been premised on ail explicit statutory presumption that"the taxpayer has no income
or loss except from the particular source and is allowed no deductions 'except those that
"may reasonably be regarded as wholly applicable to that source . ~ . and except such part
of any other 'deduction as may' reasonably be regarded' as applicable thereto','.36 In this
respect, as with other rules limiting the deduction of certain kinds of losses to income of
a similar type,37 the structure of Canada's global income tax contains various schedular
aspectsr''' . ,
While Canadian judges might have looked to US tax decisions ·to help interpret
Canada's federal income tax legislation, the dominant legal culture at the .time and the
ability to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the.Privy Council ensured. that the concept
of income for Canadian tax purposes would continue to be influenced by UK. concepts
and .principles. In Spooner v MNR,39 decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy .
Council in 1933, oil and gas royalties received by the taxpayer as partial consideration
for the sale of land to an oil and gas company were characterised as non-taxable capital
receipts, not annual profits or gains within the meaning of the IWTA..Consistent with
this approach, the Supreme' Court of Canada emphasised the distinction between income
and its source in a 1939 decision in which it rejected the Minister's argument that life
insurance proceeds were fully taxable as annual net profits or gains on the basis that
the proceeds reflected a capital element attributable to the payment of premiums by the
taxpayer's deceased husband. According to DuffC.J'-C.: .
"The legislature, is seems to me, is at pains to emphasize the distinction between
income and the source of income. The income derived from the capital source is
income for the purposes of the Act. The source is not. income for the purposes of-the
Act.,,40 . _.
32 Since 1948, the Canadian statute has also included statutory definitions for each of these sources of
income, which generally expand upon the ordinary meaning of these words. See, e.g. the definitions
of "business", "employment", "office" and "property" in s.248(1) 'of the ITA.
33 See paras 6(1)(a) and (d) of ITA 1948 and ITA 1952, and paras 56(1)(a) and (b) ofthe ITA.
34 See para.3(b) of the ITA, which generally requires taxpayers to include the amount by which their
taxable capital gains for the specific taxation year-exceeds their allowable capital losses for the year.
35 See, e.g. ITA, ss.5-8 (income from an office or employment), 9-37 (income from a business or
property), 3~55 (taxable capital gains and allowable capital losses), and 56-59.1 (other sources of
income).
36 ITA 1952, para.139(la)(a), added by 1960, c.43, 5.33(5), applicable to 1960 and subsequent taxation
years. Since 1972, this rule appears in ITA, para.4(1)(a).· .
37 See, e.g, ITA, para.3(b) (generally limiting the deduction ofa taxpayer's allowable capital losses for a
taxation year to the aggregate of the taxpayer's taxable capital gains for the year); s.18(12) (limiting the
deduction of home office expenses in respect of a business to net income otherwise computed from
the relevant business); and section 31 (limiting the deduction of farm losses). ." .
38 The introduction of schedular elements in global income taxes is increasingly common in developed
.and developing countries alike. See Thuronyi, fn.9 at 241-43.
39 ~Spooner v MNR [1933] AC 684; [1928-34] CTC 184;{1933] 1 DTC 258, PC.
4n Shaw v MNR [1939] SCR 338 at [9].· .
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Twelve years later, the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed the distinction between
income and capital receipts, characterising annuity payments that the taxpayer received
in consideration for the sale of his real estate business as a "capital payment" and not as
income within the meaning of the IWTA.41
Based on the source and trust concepts of income that UK courts had employed
to interpret the meaning of income for UK tax purposes, Canadian courts 'concluded
not only that capital payments were not subject to income tax, but that the concept of
income for Canadian tax purposes did not extend to capital gains,42 non-competition
payments.P damages for personal injuries.l" gifts,45 prizes,46 gambling proceeds' and
lottery winnings,47 and other unexpected and non-recurring receipts that Canadian courts
have generally characterised as windfalls.48 In The Queen v Cranswick,49 for example,
where a minority shareholder of Westinghouse Canada Limited received a payment from
the company's majority shareholder in order to "avoid . . . controversy or potential
litigation" after the company sold its household, appliance division at an unfavourable
price, the Federal Court of Appeal characterised the payment as a non-taxable "windfall"
41 Wilderv MNR [1952] 1 SCR 123at [8], per Rinfret C.].C.
42 See, e.g, IrrigationIndustries Ltd v MNR [1962]eTC 215; 62 DTC 1131, SCC, characterising gains
on the sale of speculative shares acquired from the issuer and held for only a few weeks or months as
non-taxable capital gains from the realisation ofan investment. "
43 See, e.g. Fortino v The QlIeell (1996) [1997J 2 CTC 2184; 97 DTC 55, TCC, concluding that non-
competition payments are capital receipts that are not subject to tax as income from an unspecified
source. See also Manrell u The Q1Jeen [2003]3 CTC 50; 2003DTC 5225,FCA, which also concluded
that non-competition payments are not taxable as capital gains on the basis that a right to compete is
not "property" the disposition of which is essential to the definition ofa capital gain under the ITA.
44 Cirella v The Qpeell [1978] CTC 1; 77 DTC 5542, FCTD, concluding (at [17]) that damages for
personal injuries are "ofa capital rather than an income nature". '
45 See, e.g. FederalFarmsLtd v MNR [1959] CTC 98; 59 DTC 1050(Ex. Ct.), characterising (at [19])
compensation received by the taxpayer from a relief fund established after a hurricane swept through
the Toronto area as a payment "in the nature ofa voluntary personal gift and nothing more."
46 See, e.g, Rother v MNR (1955) 12 Tax ABC 379; 55 DTC 277, TAB, characterising (at [8]) a cash
payment won by the taxpayer architect in a design competition for the National Gallery of Canada
as a non-taxable receipt "in the nature of a prize or gratuitous award received in the course of a
competition." See also Abraham v MNR (1960) 24 Tax ABC 133, TAB, concluding (at [13]) that a
cash payment received by the taxpayer in lieu ofa car won in a draw was "in the nature ofa non-taxable
prize." "
47 See, e.g. MNR v Mordell[1961]CTC484; 61DTC 1266,Ex. Ct., ~haracterising(at[IS]) the taxpayer's
betting activities during the years in question as a "hobby" that did not constitute "an enterprise ofa
commercial character" that was "so organized . . . as to make them a business, calling or vocation."
See also Leblancu The Queen [2007]2 CTC 2248; 2007DTC 307, TCe, concluding (at [41]) that the
taxpayers' gambling activities were "ofa personal nature" and therefore not subject to tax.
48 See, e.g. Cameron v MNR [1971]Tax ABC 645, TAB, in which the taxpayer, who carried on a fishing
business, received a share of the proceeds from the' sale of killer whales that he helped to capture
on two occasions while engaged in his fishing business. Concluding (at [9]) that the taxpayer was
"a professional salmon fisherman and not a whaler" the Board accepted the taxpayer's argument (at
[7]) that "the money received was a windfall and not income" on the basis (at [9]) that the "gain was
"fortuitous" and "not a business venture in the usual sense." See also Bellingham v Tlzelllleell (1995),
[1996]1 CTC 187; 96 DTC 6075, FCA, characterising (at [41]) a punitive damage award received
by the taxpayer as a non-taxable "windfall gain" not on the grounds that it was non-recurring or not
derived from a productive source, but on the basis that the payment did not "flow from either the
performance or breach ofa market transaction." .
49 The Queenv Cranstoick [1982]CTC 69; 82 DTC 6073,FCA.
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on the basis that the payment "was not income.earned by or arising from. the respondent's
shares, which are the only possible source ofincome in thiscase.T" :
Notwithstanding the primarily global structure of the Canadian income tax, moreover",
Canadian courts have generally interpreted the statute in a schedular manner, regularly
excluding various receipts from tax on the basis that they are not specifically included
in the statutory text. 51 In Fries v Canada,52 for example, the Supreme Court of-Canada
held that strike pay was not taxable as income from an unspecifiedsource on thebasis
that "the benefit of the doubt must go to the taxpayers.,,53 In The Queen v Atkins;54 the
Federal Court of Appeal held that a payment received' by the 'taxpayer in lieu of notice
of dismissal from his employment was neither income from the ,taxpayer's employment
nor income from an unspecified source, on the grounds that the payment was neither
contemplated by the specific statutory provisions governing a taxpayer's income from an
office or employment.P nor "remuneration for services".56 Without considering whether
payments might be income from an unspecified source, other cases held that compensation
received by a taxpayer on the cancellation ofoptions to acquire securities was not included
in computing the taxpayer's income from an office or employment on the grounds that the
options had not been "transferred or otherwise disposed of" as required by the statutory
provision governing employment benefits in respect of these options.V More. recently,
however, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a different 'approach,
concluding that a lump-sum payment in' settlement of a' claim' for disabilitybenefits
was taxable under aspecific provision for employment insurance benefits on the basis
that the payment was intended to replace an amount that, ifreceived, would have been
taxable. 58 As this application of the so-called surrogatum principle appears to depart from
cases involving payments in lieu of notice and compensation for the cancellation of stock
options, however, it is uncertain whether this novel judici~l approach will endure,
50 The Queen v Cranstoick [1982] eTC 69; 82 DTC 6073~ FCA at [15].
51 For a rare exception to this 'pattern, the statutory,basis of which is not entirely clear, see Curran v
MNR [1959]CTC 416; 59DTC 1247,SCC, in which the Court held that aninducement payment to
encourage the taxpayer to leave his former employment and commence employment with a company
controlled by the payer of the inducement was taxable as remuneration for services, . .
52 Fries v Canada [1990] 2 eTC 439, sec. .
53 Fries v Canada [1990] 2 eTC 439, SCC at [2]. For a critical analysis of this result, see B. Alarie and
M. Sudak, "The Taxation of Strike Pay" (2006) 54 Canadian Tax Journal 426.
54 TlzeQueenvAtki1zs[1976]CTC497, 76DTC 6258,FCA. ,.., .,
55 TheQ]lee1Z V Atkins [1976] CTC 497, 76 rrrc 6258, FCA,at [3] and [4], explaining that the payments
could not be regarded as "salary", "wages". or "remuneration" or as a benefit "received or enjoyed ...
in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of the office or employment" nor as deemed remuneration
within the meaning of a specific anti-avoidance rule designed to tax other kinds of consideration
_ received by officers and employees. , . '
~6 The Queen v Atki11S [1976] CTC 497; 76 DTC 6258, FCA at [5J, concluding that judicial, decisions
holding that remuneration for services is income from a source even if not income from an office or
employment "have no application to damages for wrongful dismissaL"", '.,
57 Huestis v MNR [1975] eTC 85; 75 DTC 5042, FCTD, affirmed [1975J CTC 560; 75 DT,C 5393,
FCA, affirmed [1976] eTC 792; 77 DTC 5044, sec; Bernierv The Queen [2000] 1 CTC 347; 2000
DTC 6053;FCA; and Bucciniv The Queen [2000] 1 eTC 103; 2000 DTC 6685,FCA. , . '
S8 Tsiaprailis v TheQpeell[2005] 2 CTC 1;2005 DTC 5119, sec, citing the UK decision in London and
ThamesHauen Oil Wharves Ltd v Attwooll [1967] 2 All ER 124, CA.
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As in the United Kingdom, which introduced a tax on capital gains in 1965,59 judicial
decisions based on source and trust concepts of income or a schedular interpretive
approach have often been reversed by legislative amendment.P'' In response to the Privy
Council decision in Spooner,61 for example, the federal government amended the IWTA in
1934to include "rents, royalties, annuities or other like periodical receipts which depend
upon the production or- use ofany real or personal property, notwithstanding that the same
are payable on account of the use or sale ofany such property. ,,62 In a subsequent decision
under an amended version of this provision,63 however, the Exchequer Court applied a
schedular interpretative approach, excluding a lump sum payment in satisfaction of the
taxpayer's right to periodical receipts based on the production or use of his property,
on the· basis that the provision did not include payments "in lieu of payment of, or in
satisfaction of' amounts depending upon the production or use of property.P"
In 1972, prizes were added as income from an "other" source, but only where they
are received "for achievement in a field of endeavour ordinarily carried on by the
taxpayer".65 In applying this provision, Canadian courts continue to employ a source
concept of income, concluding in one leading case that the "achievement" requirement
"rules out, for example, prizes won in games ofchance or at a costume party Of for.athletic
achievement. ,,66 In another case, in which. an unemployed cinema manager won a cash
prize on a television game show-by answering questions on Quebec cinema, Charles-de
Gaulle and Charlie Chaplin, the court held that the prize was not taxable on the basis
that "it is difficult to regard the vast field of culture as an individual's ordinary field of
endeavour" within the meaning of the statutory provision.F
After the Federal Court ofAppeal decision in Atkins,68 the ITA was amended to include
payments in lieu of notice as "retiring allowances" that (likeprizes) are specifically included
as income from an "other" source.P'' In Schwartz v The Queen,70 however, the Supreme
Court of Canada refused to apply this provision to compensation for the breach of an
59 J. Tiley, "General Description: United Kingdom", in Comparatiue Income Taxation: A Structural
Analysis (H. J.Ault (ed.), Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997) at 113. -
60 See, e.g. s.7(1.7) of the ITA, which reverses the decisions in Huestis [1975] eTC 85; Bernier[2000] 1
CTC 347 and Buccini v The Queell [2000] 1 CTC 103, by deeming the cancellation of options to be a
transfer or disposition of the options and deeming compensation received by the taxpayer in respect
of the cancellation of options to be proceeds from the transfer or disposition. See also proposed s.56.4
of the ITA, which will reverse the decisions in Fortino [1997] 2 CTC 2184 and Mal1rell [2003] 3 eTC
50, by including non-competition payments as income from an "other" source.
61 Spooner v MNR, [1933] AC 684; [1928-34] CTC 184; [1933] 1 DTC 258, PC.
62 IWTA, para.3(1)(f).
63 See ITA 1952, para.6(1)(j), which included "amounts received by the taxpayer in the year that were
dependent upon the use or production from property, whether or not they were instalments of the
sale price of the property ...." This provision is now para.12(1)(g) of the ITA.
64 MNR v Morrison [1966] eTC 558 ; 66 DTC 5368, Ex. Ct. at [13].
65 See para.56(1)(n) ofthe ITA. '
66 TheQpeel1 v Savage [1983] CTC 393; 83 DTC 5409, sec at [33].
67 Turcotte v TheQpeell [1997] 3 eTC 2359, TCe at [35].
68 The Queenv Atkins [1976] CTC 497. ,
69 See ITA, para.56(1)(a)(ii) and the definition of"retiring allowance" in ofthe ITA, s.248(1). According
to para.(b) of this definition, a retiring allowance includes an amount received ."in respect of a loss of
an office or employment of a taxpayer, whether or not received as, on account or in lieu of payment
of, damages or pursuant to an order or judgment ofa competent tribunal".
70 Schwartz v The Qluell [1996] 1 CTC 303;96 DTC 6103, scc.
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employment contract before the taxpayer commenced the duties of his employment; on
the grounds that the statutory definition ofa "retiring allowance" included only amounts
received "in respect of a loss of an office or employment," not the-loss of an "intended"
office or employment.i! Adopting a de facto schedular approach despite its affirmation
to the contrary,72 moreover, the Court also, held that the payment was not taxable as
income from an unspecified source on the basis that Parliament intended that these
payments should be governed by the specific provision for retiring allowances73~espite
its subsequent conclusion within the structure of the judgment that this specific provision
did not, in fact, apply!
Most importantly, of course, after the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation
(Carter Commission) recommended a "comprehensive tax base" along the lines of the
US accretion concept of income.i" the ITA was amended in 1972to make capital gains
partly taxable (and capital losses partly deductible}-including half of these gains. in
computing a taxpayer's total income for the year as taxable capital gains and .allowing
half of capital losses to be deducted against these taxable capital gains as allowable
capital losses.f Although the partial recognition of these gains and lossesreduces the
practical significance ofthe distinction between income and capital receipts, the distinction
remains as a prominent manifestation of the continuing influence ofUK. tax.concepts on
the structure and concept of income in Canadian tax law.
Judicial approaches to the interpretation oftax statutes andtax avoidance
Judicial approaches to the application of tax' statutes involve two related aspects:
interpretation of the relevant statutory text, and characterisation of the transactions
and relationships to which the statute applies. To the extent that. taxpayers engage in
tax-motivated transactions that contradict the scheme or purpose of the relevant statutory
text, these aspects are necessarily linked, since textual interpretative approaches are apt
to characterise transactions and relationship without regard to the economic substance
of these transactions or relationships or. the motivations of the parties-entering into
them, while more purposive approaches are more likely to characterise or re-characterise
71 Schwartz v Tire QJlee1Z [1996] 1 C'l'C 303; 96 DTC' 6103',see at [55}-[63], observing.that the words
"an intended office or employment" were enacted at the same time ill ITA, s.80~4(1)~which deems
taxpayers who obtain interest-free or low-interest loans '.'because of or as a consequence of a previous,
the current or an intended office or employment" to have received a taxable ,benefit in respect of the
loan. '
-72 Schwartz v TheQueen[1996] 1 CTC 303; 96 DTC 6103, sec at [50], declaring that "income from all
sources, enumerated or not" are taxable under the ITA (emphasis in original).
73 Schwartz v The!hleell [1996] 1 eTC 303; 96 DTC 6103, secat [52]-[54].
74 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 vols (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966).
75 See para.3(b) and subdivision c of Division B of Part I of the Income Tax Act, S.C.' 19,70.:-71, .c.63.
The taxable and allowable fractions of these gains and losses have varied over the last 20 'years, rising
to 2/3 and then 3/4 in the late 1980s and early 1990s,and returning to 1/2 in the year 2000. While
courts and commentators have occasionally considered taxable capital gains as an additional source of
income, this category of income is best understood as income from the disposition of property that may
itself constitute a source of income, rather than income from a source itself. Indeed, the language of
para.3(a), which separates the words "income for the year" and "from a source" by the parenthetical
words "other than a taxable capital gain from the disposition of property," might be read to suggest
(if somewhat awkwardly) that this category of income is not "from a source."
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.transactions and, relationships in light of their economic substance and"the objectives of
the statutory scheme. .
In the United Kingdom, judicial decisions in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries held that tax statutes should be construed strictly and literally, with ambiguities
in taxing provisions resolved in the taxpayer's favour. 76 In Cox v Rabbits,77 for example,
which was decided by the House ofLords in 1878, Lord, Cairns stated that "a Taxing Act
must be construed strictly; you must find the words to impose the tax; 'and if the words
are not found which impose the tax, it is not to be imposed.,,78 Similarly, in Partington v
Attomey-Generalf" Lord Cairns declared that "the principle of all fiscal legislation" was
that:
"". . . if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must
" be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the
other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within
theletter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the
law the case might otherwise appear to be. ,,80
In other words, he explained, "if there be admissible, in any statute, what is called
equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute
where you simply adhere. to the words of the statute.,,81 In 1921, RowlattJ. affirmed a
similar approach in Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC,82 stating that:
" ... in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room
for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a
76 The reasons for this interpretative doctrine are varied and contested. As John Tiley suggests, one
justification was the absence of any antecedent relationship between the taxpayer and the taxing
authority, as a consequence of which it was allegedly impossible to adopt any construction based on
some a prioriobligation on the part ofthe taxpayer. See Tiley; fn.20 at 51, citing Prycev M onmouthshire
Canal andRailway Companies (1878) 4.AC197 at 202-203, HL, per Lord CairnsL.C. For this reason,
as Lord Halsbury suggested in Tennant v Smith [1892] AC 50 at .54, HL, it was "impossible" in a
"tax statute "to assume any intention, any governing purpose in the Act, to more than take such tax
as the statute imposes." Another, not unrelated, explanation for this interpretive approach regarded
tax statutes as a form of penal legislation, against which courts should tilt in order to protect the
liberty of the citizen. See; e.g. Nicholls v CU1111ning (1877) 1 SCR 395at 42: "When a statute derogates
from a common law right and divests a party of his 'property, or imposes" a burthen on him, every
provision ofthe statute beneficial to him must be observed. Therefore, it has been held, tbat acts which
impose a charge or duty upon the subject must be strictly construed." Yet another rationale turns
on the presumed ease with which the legislature can amend tax legislation to correct any deficiency
attributable to a particular judicial interpretation. See, e.g. Morgllard Properties Ltd v Cit)' ofWinnipeg
(1983) 3 DLR (4th) 1at 13:"... the Legislature is guided and assisted by a well-staffed and ordinarily
very articulate Executive... The resources at hand 'in the preparation and enactment oflegislation are
such that a court must be slow to presume oversight or inarticulate intentions when the rights of the
citizen are involved. The legislature has complete control of the process of legislation, and when it has
not for any reason clearly expressed itself, it has all the resources available to correct that inadequacy
ofexpression." For a critical evaluation of this interpretive doctrine, see D. G. Duff, "Interpreting the
Income Ta..\' Act-Part 2: Toward a Pragmatic Approach" (1999) 47 Canadian TaxJounza/741 at 746.
77 Cox v Rabbits (1878) 3 AC 473, HL.
78 Cox v Rabbits(1878) 3 AC 473 at 478, HL.
79 Partington v Attorney-General (1869) 4 LR 100, HL.
80 Partington v Attorney-General (1869) 4 LR 100 at 122, HL.
81 Partington v Attorney-General (1869)4 LR 100at 122, HL.
82 Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRe [1921] 1 KB 64.
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tax, Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only 10ok fairly at the,
language usede,,83 . -
Although more recent House of Lords decisions have firmly. rejected this doctririe,
adopting a more purposive approach to the interpretation of tax statutes,84 the strict and
literal approach continued to predominate in the United Kingdom until at least the 19708,
when it was reaffirmed by the JudicialCommittee.ofthe Privy Council in'Ma"ngin v JRC.85
Together with this approach to _the interpretation of tax statutes, ,UK courts during
this period also affirmed a formalistic approach to tile characterisation of transactions and
relationships for tax purposes, concluding that these should be "ascertained upon ordinary
legal principles",86 notwithstanding their economic substance or the fact that they may
have been entered into primarily or solely in order to minimise taxes otherwise payable. In
the leading House ofLords decision in IRe v Duke ofWestminster,87 forexample, where
the Duke of Westminster established a deed of covenant designed to convert otherwise
non-deductible remuneration to his gardener into deductible "annual payments" falling
under the UK Income Tax Act 1918,a majority ofthe House ofLords upheld the Duke's
appeal against an assessment characterising the payments asnon-deductible remuneration
on the grounds that the deed itselfstated that the gardener was not prevented from "being
entitled to and claiming full remuneration for such further work as you may do".~ven
though the document also added that "it is expected that in practice you will be" content
with the provision which is being legally made for you for so long as the deed takes effect
with the addition of such sum, if any, as may be necessary to bring the total. periodical
payments while you are still in the Duke's service up to the amount of the salary or wages
which you have lately been receiving.','88. Rejecting the Commissioners' argument that
the payments were in substance non-deductible remuneration; Lord, Tomlin held that
"the substance is that which results from the legal rights and obligations of the: parties
ascertained upon ordinary legal principles",89 and denounced the "supposed doctrine"
that a court may "ignore the legal position and regard what is called 'the substance
of the matter?" on the basis that' that "the doctrine seems to involve substituting 'the
incertain and crooked cord of discretion' for 'the golden and straight metwand of the
law.",90 Concurring, Lord Russell of Killowen drew' a clear connection between the
characterisation of transactions and relationships for tax purposes and the interpretation
of tax statutes, criticising:
83 Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC [1921] 1 KB 64 at 71.
84 See, e.g. McGuckia1z v IRC [1997] STC 918, HL; and Barclays Merca1ztile Business Finance Ltd v
Mawson [2004] UKHL 51. According to Tiley, McGuckian was "[t]he first modem case where a
majority of the House ofLords came out in favour of the purposive approach," affirmingthe "move"
in the interpretation of tax statutes "from a literal interpretation to one based on context and designed
to identify the purpose ofa statute and give effect to it." Tiley, fn.20 at 52. '
85 Mangin v IRC [1971] AC 739 at 746. .
86 IRC v Duke o[West,ni,lster 19 TC 490 at 521; [1936] AC 1 at 20, per Lord Tomlin.
87 IRC v Duke ofWestminster 19 TC 490; [1936] AC 1.
88 IRC v Duke.ofWestminster 19 TC 490 at 514; [1936] AC 1 at 11-12.
89 IRC v Duke ofWestminster 19 TC 490 at 521; [1936] AC 1 at 20.
90 IRC v Duke ofWestminster 19 TC 490 at 520; [1936] AC 1 at 19.
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"... the doctrine that in taxation cases the subject is to-be taxed if, in accordance
with a Court's view of what it considers the substance of the transaction, the Court
thinks that the case falls within the contemplation of the statute. . ."
onthe basis that "[tjhe subject is not taxable by inference or analogy, but only by the plain
words of a statute applicable to the facts and circumstances of his case.,,91 . _.
j\.s a result, while UK. courts were prepared to disregard the nomenclature used by
parties in favour ofthe actual legal rights and obligations "ascertained upon ordinary legal
principles",92 and willing to ignore "sham" transactions that are "intended to give to
third parties or the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and
obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties
intend to create",93 they would not re-characterise transactions that created reallegal
rights and obligations-regardless of whether they were motivated primarily or solely
to avoid tax and contradicted the scheme or purpose of the relevant legislation. On the
contrary, as Lord Tomlin had declared in the Duke ofWestminster case:
"Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under
the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering
them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Comrriissioners
of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers- may be of his ingenuity, he cannot -be
compelled to pay an increased tax. ,,94
Like the strict and literal approach to the interpretation of tax statutes.ithis formalistic
approach to the characterisation oftransactions and relationships for tax purposes endured
through the 1970s.95 -.
In marked contrast to the UK.approach, US courts adopted a more purposive approach
to the interpretation of tax legislation and a correspondingly more substantive approach to
the characterisation of tax-motivated transactions that contradict the scheme or purpose
of the relevant legislation. -In the leading American case of Gregory v Helvering,96 for
example, where the taxpayer engaged in a tax-motivated corporate reorganisation intended
to distribute to herself publicly-traded shares held by a private holding company without
incurring tax that would otherwise apply to the distribution, the US Supreme Court
upheld an -assessme-nt characterising the reorganisation as a taxable dividend on the
basis that the transactions were "outside the plain intent of the statute" notwithstanding
91 IRC v Duke ofWestminster 19 TC 490 at 524; [1936] AC 1 at 24.
92 IRC v Duke ofWestminster 19 TC 490 at 521; [1936] AC 1 at 20.
93 Snook v London fS WestRiding Inuestments Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 518 at 528, CA, per Lord Diplock.
94 IRC v Duke ofWestminster 19 TC 490 at 520; [1936] AC 1 at 19. -
95 The House ofLords qualified the traditional approach in three decisions in the early 19805, in- which
it developed a so-called "step-transactions doctrine" whereby it assessed the tax consequences of a
series of transactions by disregarding individual steps in the series and looking at the end result of
the series as a whole. See W.T. Ramsay Ltd v IRe [1981] STC 174; [1982] AC 300, HL; IRe v
Burmah Oil Co Ltd [1982] STC 30, HL; and Furniss v Dawson 55 TC 324; [1984] AC 474, HL.
Subsequent decisions in the United Kingdom appear to have limited the doctrine, characterising it as
an interpretive principle rather than an independent anti-avoidance doctrine. See McGuckian v IRe
[1997] STC 918, HL; MacNiven v WestnlOrelal1d Inuestments Ltd [2001] uxm, 6; [2001] STC 237;
and BarclaysMercantile Business FinanceLtd v Mawson [2004]~ 51. For a useful discussion of
developments in UK tax law over the last 25 years, see Freedman, fn.B.
96 Gregory v Heluering(1935) 293 US 465.
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that they adhered to· the text of the statutory definition for a tax-free reorganisation.V
According to Sutherland]:
"[F]ixing on the character of the proceeding by what actually 'occurred, what do we
firid? Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose-s-a mere device
which put on the form ofa corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its true
character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation
of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any -part ofa business, but to
transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner.
In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are.susceptible ofbut one
interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of
the [statute], was infact an elaborate and devious fomi ofconveyance masquerading
as a corporate reorganization, and, nothing else..... To hold otherwise would be to
exalt artifice above reality. and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all
serious purpose, ,;.98 '
Based on its purposiveinterpretation of the relevant .Iegislation, therefore, the Court
held that the transactions were properly characterised as a taxable dividend rather than a
tax-free, corporate reorganisation. ,_ _ ,_
Following Gregory v Heluering, VS courts developed broad ;juQiciiil anti-avoidance
doctrines in 'the 'form of a "business purpose test" and "substance over form doctrine",
According to the former, tax benefits otherwise available under the relevant legislation
could' be denied . to taxpayers who entered -into transactions or relationships', solely OJ;
primarily to obtain tax benefits not clearly intended by 'the legislation.l" According
to the latter, transactions should be characterised for tax 'purp9ses 'according to' their
commercial or economic substance rather than their legal form. IOOAS',a result, although
the US Supreme Court in Gregory' uHeluering, like :the House ofLords in the Duke
01 Westminster, 'affirmed "[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to .dec~ease_the- amount of
what otherwisewould be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the- law
pepnits,,,lOI this right was not unfettered in the U.S, but subject to judicial anti-avoidance
doctrines. .'
As with their approach to the structure and concept of income in the Canadian income
tax, Canadian courts were quick to embrace the UK. approach to the interpretation of
tax statutes and the characterisation of transactions and relationships for tax purposes,
. rather than the purposive 'and substantive approach favoured by US 'courts. In a 1922
decision involving provincial tax legislation in Alberta, for example, the Supreme Court
'97 Gregory v Heluering (1935)293US 465 at 470.
98 Gregory v Helcering(1935) 293 US 465 at 469. .
99 See, e.g. Bazley v Commission ofIn'ternaI Revenue (1947)331 US 737; and Goldstein v Commissioner of
Internal Revenue(1966) 364 F2d 734,-2d Cir., cert. denied (1967) 385 US 1005.
,100 See,.e.g. Commissioner ofInternaI Revenuev CourtHolding(1945)'324 US 331;and Waterman Steamship
Corporation v Commissioner ofIntemaI Revenue (1970) 430 F~d 1185, 5th Cir., cert, denied.(1971) 401
US 939.
;,101 Gregory v Heloering (1935) 293US 465 at 469.
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of Canada cited the House of Lords decision in Tennant v Smith 102 for the proposition
that "[a] law imposing- taxation should always be construed strictly against the taxing
authorities since it restricts the public in the enjoyment of its property.'~103 In a 1946
decision applying the IWTA, the Supreme Court of Canada cited the'Duke ofWestminster
case for the proposition that "the true legal position" resulting from a contract "may not
be ignored in favour of the supposed 'substance'" of the transaction.104In subsequent tax
cases throughout the 1970s, Canadian courts consistently affirmed the doctrine that tax
statutes should be construed strictly and literally,105 and routinelycited the principle that
tax should be assessed according to the true legal position of the parties irrespective of
economic substance or the motivations of the parties. 106
Not surprisingly, this judicial approach to the interpretation of tax statutes and .. to
the characterisation of transactions and relationships for tax purposes had significant
consequences for the development of Canadian income tax law. Since courts were
generally unwilling to interpret statutory provisions in light of their purpose, legislative
drafters developed a, detailed and prolix writing style in order -to prevent judicial
misunderstanding-a process, as one Canadian commentator explains, that became "self-
perpetuating" as detailed legislative provisions encouraged courts "to conclude that the
treatment of the subject is exhaustive, and that the legislation is meant to say exactly what
it says and does not mean to say anything that it omits.,,107 Since courts were reluctant
to .include as income amounts that were not specifically identified in the statutory text,
Parliament responded with.regular amendments designed to "plug the gaps" created by
restrictive judicial interpretations.l'f S~ce taxpayers could rely on the literal words ofthe
statute and the legal form of transactions and relationships to plan their way around the
rules of the statute,109 Parliament introduced a multitude of specific anti-avoidance rilles
102 Tennant v S111it/z [1892J AC 50 at 54,~.
103 Canadian Northern Railway Co v The Q!teell (1922) 64 SCR 264 at [49J, per BrodeurJ.
104 Dominion Telegraph Securities Ltd v MNR (1946) [1947] SCR 45; [1946J ere 239 (S.C.C.) at [19] per
Kellock J. See also Pioneer Laundry and DlJ' Cleaners Ltd. v MNR [1939J 1 SCR 1; [1938-39] CTC
401, SCC at [10], per Davis]. (dissenting); and Canada China. Clay Ltd v Hepbunl [1945J CTC 91,
SCC at [64]-[72], per KellockJ. (dissenting).
105 See, e.g. The King v Crabbs (1934), [1928-34J CTC 288, 1 DTC 272, sec; Worthington v A-G
Manitoba (1936), [1935-37] CTC 193, SCC; The King v Montreal Telegraph Co [1945] CTC 287,
SCC; MNR v Sheldon's Engineering Ltd [1955] CTC 174, 55 DTC 1110, SCC; and Mal/otley's Studio
v The Queen [1979] CTC 206; 79 DTC 5124, SCC.
106 See, e.g. Army fS Navy Department Store Ltd vMNR [1953] CTC 293; 53 DTC 1185, SCC; Front CS
SimcoeLtd v MNR [1960] CTC 123, 60 DTC 1081, Ex. Ct.; Balstone FarmsLtd v MNR [1966] CTC
738; 66 DTC 5482, Ex. Ct.; Leveque v MNR [1968] eTC 179; 68 DTC 5116, Ex. Ct.; MNR V Cox
[1969] CTC 606; 69 DTC 5400, Ex. Ct.; MNR v Ouellette [1971] CTC 121; 71 DTC 5094, Ex. Ct.;
and MNR v Cameron [1972] CTC 380; 72 DTC 6325, SCC.
107 S. Bowman, "Interpretation of Tax Legislation: The Evolution of Purposive Analysis" (1995) 43
Canadian Tax Jounlal 1167 at 1183.
108 See Bowman, fn.107 at 1184. Several examples of these amendments are discussed in the previous
part of this article. .
109 D. Sherbaniuk, "Tax Avoidance-Recent Developments" in Report ofthe Proceedingsofthe Twenty-
First Tax Conference (Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 1969) at 430, describing strict and literal
construction of taxing statues and characterisation of transactions and relationships according to the
legal position of the parties as the two "pillars of tax planning".
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(SAARs) designed to limit these opportunities.U" The result, as a prominent Canadian
tax scholar wrote in 1969 (when the Canadian income tax-was much shorter and less
complicated than it is todayl), is "a hopelessly complex, unmanageable labyiin~."111
As in the United Kingdom, Canadian courts began to question the traditional approach
in the late 1970s and early- 1980s. In 1976, -the Federal Court of Appeal hinted 'at
the development of a US-style business purpose test, concluding that personal services
corporations that the taxpayers had" incorporated primarily for' tax reasons could be
disregarded as shams on the basis that they lacked a bonafide-bus~ess purpose".112 In 1984,
the Supreme Court of Canada formally rejected strict construction in- Stubart Investments
Ltd v The Queen, 113affirming instead Professor Elmer Driedger's so-called "modern rule"
according to which the words of an Act are to" be read "in their entire context and in
their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme ofthe Act, the object
of the Act, and the intention 'of Parliament. ,,114 "At the' same time, 'however, the Court
was reluctant to abandon-the traditional approach to the characterisation oftransactions
and relationships, refusing to adopt ajudicial business purpose test, 115 an~ declaring that
taxpayers remained free to avail themselves ofbeneficial tax provisions oncei'contextually
construed" provided that there was "no prohibition in the Act" .116._
Despite its reluctancein Stubart Inuestments to reject the legacy of-legal formalism,
subsequent Supreme Court of Canada tax decisions in the 1980s "arid :early 1990s
displayed a -much greater willirtgness to questionthe characterisation of transactions
and relationships according -to their legal form. In Johns.:..Manville -Canada Inc -'v The
fhi,een,II7 for example, Estey J. stated on behalf of a unanimous panel "ofthe 'Court that
the distinction between a" current expenditure (whichis fully deductiblein the year-in
which it is incurred) and a capital expenditure (the cost of which is generally deductible
only over a number of years) should depend on "a commonsense appreciation of all the
110 See the summary of these rules in D.G. Duff, B. Alarie, K. Brooks.and L. Philipps, Canadian Income
Tax Law (2nd ed., LexisNexis Butterworths, Toronto, 2006) at 183.
HI See Sherbaniuk, fn.l09 at 435.
112 MNR v Leon [1976] CTC 532; 76 DTC 6299, FCA.
113 Stubart Investments Ltd v The Qlleen [1984] CTC 294; 84"DTC 6305, SCC. '
114 E.A. Driedger, Construction ofStatutes (2nd ed., Butterworthsc Toronto, 1983) at 87, cited, in Stubart
Investments [1984] CTC 294; 84 DTC 6305, SCC at para.filrSee also Golden v The Queen [1986] 1
~TC 274; 86 DTC 6138, SCC, in which a majority of the Court declared (at [IQ]) that: "In Stubart
[...] the Court recognized that in the construction of taxation statutes the law is'not confined to a
literal and virtually meaningless interpretation of the Act "wherethe wordswillsupport on abroader
construction a conclusion which is workable and in harmony with the evidentpurposes of the Act in
question. Strict construction in the historic sense no longerfinds aplace in the canons of interpretation
applicable to taxation statutes." , ":',
115 Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen [1984] CTC 294; "84 DTC'"6305; sec "at [55], per-E~tey J.
concluding that such a test would contradict Parliament's apparent intent. to encourage specific
activities through tax incentives. In a concurring judgment, WilsonJ. rejected a businesspurpose
test (at [71H72]) on the grounds that it would be "a complete rejection" of the" Duke of Westminster
principle that taxpayers may order their affairs to minimise tax, which was "far too,deeply entrenched
in our tax law for the courts to reject it in the absence of clear statutory authority."·
116 Stubart Inuestments Ltd v The Qpeen [1984] eTC 294; 84 DTC 6305, SCC at [66]~ per Estey J.
1)7 Johns-Manville Canada Inc v The Queen [1985] 2 eTC 111; 85 DTC 5373, SCC.
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guiding features" of the expenditure.U'' or "what the expenditure is calculated to effect
from a practical and business point of view rather than upon the juristic classification of
legal rights..." .119 In Imperial General Properties Ltd v The Quee~,120 where the taxpayer
wasassessed on the grounds that it was "controlled" by and. therefore "associated" with a
family holding company that held 90 per cent of its common shares but only.50 per cent
ofits voting shares,121 a majority of the Court dismissed the taxpayer's appeal on the basis
that the holding company's ability to cause the taxpayer to be wound up on economically
favourable terms gave it "[c]ontrol, in the real sense of the term,,,122notwithstanding that
it did not own a majority of the voting shares. According to the Court:
"In determining. the proper application. of [the relevant· statutory provision] to
circumstances before a court, the court is not limited to a highly technical and
narrow interpretation of the legal rights attached to the shares of a corporation,
Neither is the court constrained to examine those rights in.the context only of their
immediate application in a corporate meeting."123
In each ofthese cases, therefore, the Court's more purposive approach to the interpretation
of the ITA was complemented by a more substantive approach to the characterisation of
transactions and relationships for tax purposes. .
Although the decisions in Johns-Manville and Imperial General Properties demonstrated
an increasing willingness on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada to characterise
transactions and relationships in light of -their commercial or economic reality, the
high point of this substantive approach was its 1987 decision in Bronfman Trust v The
Queen -.124 Disallowing the deduction of interest expenses on borrowed funds on the
basis that the funds were used by the taxpayer to finance capital distributions to .its sole
beneficiary and not to earn income from business or property as required by the relevant
statutory provision,125 the Court explicitly affirmed a more substantive approach to: the
characterisation of transactions and relationships for tax purposes, welcoming a "recent
118 JOlzl1s-Matlvi//e Canada 11lC v Tlze Queel1 [1985] 2 eTC 111; 85 DTC 5373, SCC at [41], citing the
decision of the Privy Council in B.P Australia Ltd v Commissioner ofTaxation ofthe Commontaealth of
Australia [1966] AC 224 at 264, PC, per Lord Pearce. . .
119 Johns-Manville Canada Inc v The !lJleen [1985] 2 CTC 111; 85 DTC 5373, sec at [42], citing the
decision of the Australian High Court in Hallstroms Pty Ltd v peT (1946) 72 CLR 634 at 648, Aust.
H.C., per Dixon].
120 Imperial General Properties Ltd v The Queen [1985] 2 ere 299; 85 DTC 5500, sec.
121 The effect of this assessment was that the taxpayer corporation and the holding company were required
the share the amount eligible for a low rate of corporate tax under the "small business deductiori" in
ITA, s.125.
122 Imperial General Properties Ltd v The Queen [1985] 2 CTC 299; 85 DTC 5500, sce at [14].
123 Imperial General Properties Ltd v The !lJleel1 [1985] 2 eTC 299; 85 DTC 5500, SCC at' [11], per Estey]. .
124 Bronfman Trust v The QJleen [1987] 1 eTC 117; 87 DTC 5059, SCC. For detailed discussions of this
case, see D.G. Duff, "Interpreting the Income Tax Act-Part 1: Interpretive Doctrines" (1999) 47
Canadian TaxJounlal 464 at 489; and D. G. Duff, "Interest Deductibility, the Reasonable Expectation
of Profit Test and the Supreme Court of Canada: From Bronfman Trust and MiJldorvan to' Singleton,
Ludmer, Stewart and Walls," in Advocacy and Taxation in Calzada (David W. Chodikoffand James L.
Horvath (eds), Irwin Law, Toronto, 2004) 399 at 402. .
125 ITA, subpara.20(1)(c)(i).
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trend in tax cases towards attempting to ascertain the true commercialandpractical nature
of the taxpayer's transac.tions,"126 and d_eclaring ~at: . .
"Assessment of taxpayers' transactions with an' eye to commercial and economic
realities, rather than juristic classification of form, may help to avoid, the inequity of
tax liability being dependent upon the taxpayer's sophistication at manipulating' a
sequence of events to achieve a patina of compliance with the apparent prerequisites
for a tax deduction. ,,127 .
As: the Supreme Court of' Canada's decision in Stubart Investments refecte4, the legacy
of strict and literal interpretation, therefore, its decision in Bronfman'Trust rejected the
legacy of legal formalism. Three years later, in McClurg v The Queen~ 128. the Supreme
Court ofCanada reaffirmed its break from the traditional judicial approach to tax statutes,
explaining that courts should "determine both the 'purpose of the legislative provision
and the economic and commercial reality of the taxpayer's actions.,,129
Notwithstanding these judicial developments, however, the' federal .government
concluded in 1987 that existing rules were "inadequate to. deal with a..number of
blatant tax avoidance arrangements" and that it should enact a statutory general anti-
avoidance rule (GAAR) "to prevent artificial tax avoidance arrangements" and toreduce
what the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Stubart Inoestments had described as the:
" ..'. action and. reaction endlesslyproduced by complex.. specific tax measures
aimed at sophisticated business' 'practices, and the. inevitable, professionally-guided
and equally specialized taxpayerreaction.t'P'' , .
As subsequently enacted,' this provision allows the revenue authorities to: determine -a
person's tax consequences' -"as is reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny ,a tax
benefit" whenever _the tax benefit results from a transaction or series of transactions of
which the 'transaction is a part, the transaction may reasonably be 'considered to have
been undertaken or arranged primarily to obtain 'the tax' benefit, and the transaction may
reasonably be considered to result in a misuse ofspecific provisions ofthe ITA or an abuse
having regard to these provisions read as a whole. 131 As the GAAR generally applies only
to transactions entered into on or after September 13, 1988, however, it was'.not until
2005 that the Supreme Court of-Canada first considered this provision.,132: .
126 Bronfman Trust v The Queen [1987] 1 CTC 117; 87DTC 5059, scc« [48]..'.
127 Bronfman Trust v The Qluell [1987] 1 eTC 117; 87 DTC 5059, SCCat [49].-
128 Bronfman Trust v The f!Jleell [1991] 1 CTC 169; 91 DTC 5001, SCC. For a detailed discussion of this
case, see Duff (1999), fn.124 at 494-50l.
·129 McClurg v TheQlteen[1991] 1 eTC 169; 91 DTC 5001, SCC at [46]. .-
130 Canada, Department of Finance, The White Paper: Tax Reflnn1987 (Department of Finance, Ottawa,
June 18, 1987), reproduced in White Paper on Tax Reform (CCH, Don Mills,.ON~ 1987) 23 -at 70,
citing Stubart Inuestments, [1984] CTC 294; 84 DTC 6305, sec at [67]. .
131 ITA,\ s.245. In order to reverse two Tax Court of Canada decisions questioning whether the GAAR
would apply to the misuse or abuse of other relevant enactments such as regulations or tax treaties,
the provision was amended in 2005 to mention these other enactments as well.
132 Canada Trustee Mortgage -Co v The Queen [2005] 5 CTC 215; 2005 DTC 5523, SCC; and Mathew v
TheQ]teen [2005] 5 eTC 244; 2005 DTC 5538, sec. For detailed discussions of these decisions, see
D.G. Duff "The Supreme Court of Canada and the General Anti-Avoidance Rille: Canada Trustco
and Mathew" (2006) 60 BFIT 54;J.Li, "Economic Substance: Drawingthe Line Between Legitimate
Tax Minimization and Abusive Tax Avoidance" (2006) 54 Canadian Tax Joumal 23; and B.}. Arnold,
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While one might have thought that enactment of a statutory GAAR would have sent
a strong signal to Canadian courts to employ a purposive interpretative approach and
a substantive approach to the characterisation of transactions and relationships for tax
purposes, irrespective of the provision's actual application to. the facts of any particular
case, the introduction ofthis statutory provision appears to have had the opposite effect.133
In contrast to the purposive and substantive approach to tax statutes that the Supreme
Court of Canada adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Court's tax jurisprudence
from the rnid-1990s to the early 2000s saw a return to kind of the textual interpretation
and legal formalism that characterized the traditional judicial approach to tax statutes-.134
The first indication of this judicial reaction was the Supreme Court of Canada's
1994 decision in Antosko v The Queen.135 Rejecting the Minister's argument that the
taxpayers should not.be entitled to a deduction thatwas not intended by the applicable
statutory provision and would result in an unanticipated windfall, the Court relied ona
"straightforward grammatical reading" of the provision to allow the taxpayers' appeal. 136
More importantly, the Court stated: - ,
"While it is true that the courts must view discrete sections of the Income Tax,Act in
light of the other provisions of the Act and of the purpose of the legislation, and that
they must analyze a given transaction in the context of economic and commercial
reality, such techniques cannot alter the result where the words of the statute are
clear and plain and where the practical effect of the transaction. is undisputed. ,
***
"Confusion Worse Confounded-The Supreme Court's GAAR Decisions" (2006) 54 Canadian Tax
Jourlla/167. For more general discussions ofthe impact ofthe cases on tax avoidance in 'Canada, see B.
Alarie, S. Bhatia, and D.G. Duff, "Symposium on Tax Avoidance After Canada Trustee and Mathew:
Summary of Proceedings" (2005) 53 Canadian Tax Jounzall010; and D.G. Duff and H. Erlichman
(eds), Tax Avoidance in Canada after Canada Trusteo and Mathew (Irwin Law, Toronto, 2007).
133 See D.G. Duff, "Justice Iacobucci and the 'Golden and Straight Metwand' of Canadian Tax Law"
(2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Jounzal 525 at 576, suggesting that theleading tax judge on the
Supreme Court of Canada during the 1990s took the view that the enactment of a statutory GAAR
meant that this provision, rather than judicial action should be relied upon to prevent unacceptable
tax avoidance, ' .
134 The explanation for this shift has much to do with key personalities on the Supreme Court of Canada,
who were able to shape its tax jurisprudence during their tenure. From the late 19705 to the early
1990s, the Court's purposive and substantive approach was championed by Dickson J. who became
ChiefJustice in April 1984 and retired from the bench in June 1990, and by Estey]. who retired in
April 1988. From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the literal and formalist approach was advanced
by Justice Iacobucci who was appointed to the Court in January 1991 and retired in]une 2004, Major
J.who was appointed to the Court in November 1992 and retired in December 2005, and McLachlin
J. who was appointed to the Court in March 1989 and became ChiefJustice in January 2000. For a
detailed account of Iacobucci}. 's influence on the transformation of Canadian income tax law in the
1990s and early 2000s, see Duff, fn.133 at 541.
135 Antosko v The Qpeetz [1994] 2 CTC 25; 94 DTC 6314, SCC. For detailed discussions of this decision,
see Duff, (1999) fn.124 at 507; and Duff, fu.133 at 542., .
136 Antosko v The !2luell [1994] 2 eTC 25; 94 DTC 6314, SCC at [46].
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Where the words of the section are not ambiguous, it is not for this Courtto find
that the appellants should be disentitled to a deduction because they do .not deserve
a 'windfall', .as the respondent contends."137 ;". ,.'
Asthe transactions at issue adhered 'to the "plain meaning" of the statutory provision,138
the Court concluded, the taxpayers were entitled to the deduction. "
.' ,.The next year, the Supreme Court ofCanada reaffirmed this "plain meaning" approach
in Friesen v The Queen~139'in which a majority of the 'Court allowed the taxpayer to utilise
a' statutory "lower of cost or market value" rule to recognise an 'accrued loss' on asingle
item of vacant land that the taxpayer acquired as an adventure or-concern in 'the -nature
of trade on the basis that this result was 'authorised bya "plain reading" of the relevant
statutory provisions.140Describing the "plain meaning rule" as the "correct approach" to
the interpretation oftax legislation in Canada,141 the judgment also accepted the following
statement from a treatise on Canadian income tax law:
"When "a provision is couched in specific language rhar admits: ()f no doubt or
ambiguity in its application to the facts, then the' provision' must be applied
regardless of its object and purpose. Only when the statutory language .admits of
some doubt or ambiguity' in its application to the facts is it useful to: resort .to the
object and purpose of the provision'."~42
By the mid-1990s, therefore, a majority 'of the Supreme Court of Canada' had rejected
purposive interpretation in favour of a more literal interpretive approach' reminiscent of
pre-Stubart Investments tax jurisprudence.143
In subsequent years, the Supreme Court ofCanada combined this renewed .emphasis on
textual interpretation with a return to the formalist approach that preceded its decisions in
Johns-Manville., 144 Imperial General Properties,145 and Bronfman Trust.146 In Shell Canada
137 Antosko v TheQlleen[1994] 2 CTC 25; 94 DTC 6314, SCC at [29] ~d [3,8],per'Ia·c~buc~iJ.·-
138 Antosko v TheQlleen[1994] 2 CTC 25; 94 DTC 63~4, SCC at [41]. ...,
139 Friesen v' The Queen [1995] 3 SCR 103, SCC'. For a 'detailed discussion, of this decision, see Duff
(1999), fn.124 at 511. ,,' ' ,.' , :.
140 Friesen.u The Queen [1995] 3 SCR 103, SCC at [71]. For a' critical assessment of this assumed "plain
. meaning" see Duff(1999), fn.124 at 515,'arguing that because the relevant statutory provisionallowing
inventory to be valued at the lower of its cost or fair market value applied only "[t]or the purpose of
computing income from a business," a taxpayer with a single item of inventory held in an adventure
. in the nature of trade should not have been able to access the rule to trigger a loss for tax purposes
because there was no reason to compute the .taxpayer's income or loss from the business until the
inventory ,vas sold. . ,
'141 Friesen v TheQueen [1995] 3 SCR 103, see at [10], per Major J.
,142 Friesen v The Q]leen [1995] 3 SCR 103,SCe at [I Ij.iciting P.W. Hogg andJ.E..Magee, Principles of
CanadianIncome Tax Law (Carswell, Scarborough, Ontario, 1995) at 453.' .
. 143 Curiously, this is despite the Court's affirmation during the very same year ofa "teleological approach"
to the interpretation oftax statutes, according to which a court should "first... determine the purpose
of the legislation, whether as a whole or as expressed in a particular provision" and construe the
provision at issue according to "the purpose underlying it." Corporation Notre-Dame de Bon-Secoursv
Q]ltbec [1994] 1 CTC 241 at 250 and 252,95 DTC 5017, sec, per GonthierJ.
, 144 Johns-Manville CanadaInc v TheQueen [1985] 2 CTe 111; 85 DTC 5373, SCC.
;, 145 Imperial GeneralProperties Ltd u TheQlleen[1985] 2 CTC 299; 85 DTC 5500, sec.
146 Bronfman Trust v TheQueen [1987] 1 CTC 117; 87 DTC 5059, SCC.
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·v The Qp,een,147 for example, where the taxpayer engaged in a classic "tax ..arbitrage"
transaction designed to generate fully deductible interest expenses 'on a weak .currency
loan and a partly taxable foreign exchange gain when the debt was subsequently repaid, ~~8
the Court refused to disallow or limit the taxpayer's deduction of interest expenses on the
basis that "absent a provision of the A~t to the contrary or a finding that they are a sham,
a taxpayer's legal relationships must be respected in tax cases.,,149 Similarly in Singleton v
TheQueen,150 where the taxpayer contributed borrowed funds to a legal partnership from
which he simultaneously withdrew funds to purchase a house, the Court permitted, the
deduction of interest expenses on the borrowed funds on the grounds that courts must
not "search for the economic realities" of the' transactions.P! but should instead assess
each transaction independently "[i]n order to give effect to the legal relationships" that
they created. 152 In Ludmer v MNR,153 which involved another tax arbitrage transaction
designed to obtain fully deductible interest expenses and a subsequent partly taxable
capital gain, the Court again refused to disallow or limit the deduction of interest expenses
on the grounds, among others, that courts should not interpret provisions of the ITA
to preventtax avoidance "when. it is open to Parliament to be precise and specific with
respect to any mischief to be prevented," and that "[t]o do otherwise would be to fail to
give appropriate weight to the well-established principle that, absent a provision to the
contrary, taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs for the sole purpose of achieving a
favourable position regarding taxation.,,154 .'
Not surprisingly, as occurred prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's more purposive
and substantive approach in the 1980sand.early 1990s, the federal government responded
to several of these decisions with specific amendments designed to 'clarify the statutory
scheme and limit further opportunities for avoidance. In response to Friesen;155 for
example, the ITA was amended to exclude adventures or concerns in the nature oftrade
from the statutory lower of cost or market ~alue rule,156 and to specify that inventory
held as an adventure or concern in the nature of trade must be valued at cost (thereby
147 Shell Canada v The Queen [1999] 4 eTC 313; 99 DTC 5669, SCC. For 'a critical examination of
this decision, see D.G. Duff, "Weak Currency Borrowings and the General Anti-Avoidance Rule in
Canada: From Shell Canada to Canadian Pacific" (2001) 55 BFID 233 at 234.
148 For a useful definition of "tax arbitrage" see D.N. Shaviro, "The Story ofKnetsch: Judicial Doctrines
Combating Tax Avoidance" in Caron (ed.), fn.25, 313 at 315, explaining that tax arbitrage, like
arbitrage in financial or other markets, results from price differentials (in the case of tax arbitrage,
differences in the tax treatment ofrevenues and expenditures) that enable the arbitrageur (or taxpayer,
in the case of tax arbitrage) to profit from these differences without incurring significant transactions
costs.
149 Sllell Canada v The QJJeell [1999] 4 CTC 313; 99 DTC 5669, SCC at [39], per McLachlinJ. (as she
then was).
150 Singleton v The Qpeell [2002] 1 CT~ 121, 2001 DTC 5533, SCC. For a detailed discussion ~f this
decision, see Duff(2004), fn.124 at 409. '.
151 Singletonv The Queen[2002] 1 CTC 121; 2001 DTC 5533, SCC at [31].
152 Singleton v TheQueell [2002] 1 CTC 121; 2001 DTC 5533, sec at [34], per Major J.
153 Ludmer v MNR [2002] 1 CTC 95, 2001 DTC 5505, SCC. For detailed discussions of this decision,
see Duff (2004), fn.124 at 411-16; and Duff, fn.133 at 556. " .
154 Ludmer v MNR [2002] 1 CTC 95, 2001 DTC 5505, SCC at [39] per IacobucciJ.
155 [1995] 2 CTC 369; 95 DTC 5551, sec. " . ..
156 ITA, s.10(1), amended by S.C. 1998, c. 19, s.70(1), applicable to taxation years ending after December
20, 1995.
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preventing the recognition ofaccrued but unrealized losses in the value ofthe inventory).157
In response to Shell Canada,158 Parliament enacted a lengthy and complicated specific
anti-avoidance rule designed to eliminate the tax advantagesotherwise available from weak
currency borrowings.P" In response to Ludmer160 and other' Supreme' Court of Canada
decisions allowing the deduction of interest expenses on borrowed money used to acquire
property designed to produce a deferred partly taxable capital "gain,161 the Department
ofFinance introduced draft legislation establishing a statutory ·"reasonable expectation' 'of
profit" test, disallowing the deduction ofa business 'or property loss where it is not: '
". . . reasonable to expect that the taxpayer will realize a cumulative profit from' that
business or property for the period in"which the. taxpayer has carried on,"and can
reasonably be expected to carryon, that business orhas held, 'and can reasonably be
expected to hold, that property. ,,162' , '
More than four years after it was introduced, this draftlegislation remains uri-enacted, as
a result of which taxpayers can still engage in various kinds of tax:arbitrage transactions
in Canada-subject, that is, to the potential application of the statutory.GAAR~ ,
Returning to the GAAR, finally, ,the legacy of strict and literal interpretation" and
formalist characterisation 'appears to have endured even: in' the interpretation' ofthis
provision, which was enacted in order to supplant. this traditionalapproach.Although the
first Supreme Court of Canada decisions to consider the'GAAR signalled areturn to a more
contextual and purposive approach to the interpretation oftax statutes-s-emphasising that
the GAAR and other provisions of the ITA "must be interpretedin a textual, contextual
and purposive way"163-the Court also observed that the ITA is "dominated by explicit
provisions dictating specific consequences; inviting 'a'largely textual interpretation.l'P"
As a result, although other recent Supreme. C()l~~t of Canada decisions also suggest a
157 ITA, s.10(1.01), added by S.C. 1998, c. 19, s.70(1), applicable to taxation years ending after December
20, 1995.
158 [1999] 4 CTC 313, 99 DTC 5669, sec.
159 ITA, s.20.3, added by S.C. 2001, c. 17, s. 14(1), applicable to taxation years ending after"February 27,
2000. . . .
160 Ludmerv MNR [2002] 1 eTC 95 ; 2001 DTC 5505, SCC.
161 Stewart v TheQueell [2002] 3 eTC 439; 2002 DTC 6969, sec; and TheQueel~ v Walls [2002] 3 CTC
421; 2002 DTC 6960, sec. For adetailed diSCUSSIon of these decisions and the judicial "reasonable
expectation ofprofit" test that they rejected, see Duff(2004), fn.124 at 416-27. See also' the discussion
ofStewart in Duff, fn.133 at 562. '
162 Proposed ITA, s.3.1(1), released October 31,'2003. ,
163 Canada Trustco Mortgage Cov TheQueelz [2005] 5 eTC 215; 2005 DTC 5523, SCC at [11]. According
to the Court (at [10]): "The interpretation ofa statutory provisionmlist be made according to a textual,
contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that"is harmonious with the Act asawhole."
164 Canada TrusteD Mortgage Co v The Qpeelz [2005] 5' ~TC 215; 2005' DTC 5523,SCC.at·[13].' Lest
this- approach be misconstrued as a version of the "plain meaning rule", however, the"'Court was
careful to note that "statutory context and purpose may reveal or resolve latent ambiguities" even
in circumstances where "the meaning of particular provisions may not appear ambiguous at first
glance"--emphasising that "language can never be interpreted independently of its context, and
legislative purpose is part of context.n Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v' The flJleen [2005]-5 eTC ,215;
2005 DTC 5523, SCC at [47], citing P.W.' Hogg, J.Magee, and J. Li, Principles ofCanadian Income
Tax Law (4th ed., Carswell, Scarborough, 2002) at 563. '
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more purposive approach to the interpretation oftax legislation,165 the legacy ofstrict and
literal interpretation endures .in a largely textual approach to the interpretation ofdetailed
legislative provisions that were drafted in light of strict and literal interpretation.P'' :': -
More significantly, the Court's reading of the GAAR suggests a continuing reluctance
to abandon the traditional emphasis that UK and Canadian courts have placed ,on the
legal substance of transactions and relationships, irrespective of their economic substance
or the motivations of the parties. Explaining that the GAAR "does not permit the
'recharacterization' of a transaction for the purposes of determining whether or not it
is an avoidance transaction",167 the Court concluded that courts must "examine the
relationships between the parties and the actual transactions that were executed between
them" in order to decide whether the GAAR applies,~.68 and may not conclude. that
an avoidance transaction is abusive solely because it lacks economic substance.P'' More
generally, the Court declared, although the GAAR, may have weakened the' Duke of
Westminster principle,170 this traditional approach endures despite the "superimposition'.'
of a prohibition on abusive tax avoidance.l " As a result, it seems, the formalist approach
continues to.persist despite the introduction ofa statutory GAAR.. Whether this approach
will continue as the Supreme Court of Canada considers future GAAR cases remains to
be determined.Vf
165 See PlacerDonze Canada Ltd v The Qpeen [2006] 1 SCR 715; Imperial Oil Ltd v The Queen [2006] 2
SCR 447; and A. Y.S.A. Amateur 'YouthSoccer Ass~eiatioll v Canada[2006] 1 SCR 715.
166 For this reason, the vitality of more purposive approaches to the interpretation of tax statutes may
depend on more principles-based approaches to the drafting of tax legislation: For suggestions along
theselines, see ].F. Avery Jones, "Tax· Law; Rules or Principles?" [1996] BTR 580; D. Weisbach,
"Formalism in the Tax Law" (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 860; and J. Braithwaite,
"Making Tax Law More Certain: A Theory" Australian National University'Centre for Tax System
Integrity, Working Paper No. 44 (December 2002), currently available at: http:IIctsi.anu.edu.au/
publications/ WP/ 44.pd[ (accessed May 1, 2008); and S. Picciotto, "Constructing Compliance:
Game-playing, Tax Law and the Regulatory State" (2007) 29 Law, CS Pol. 11. For a discussion
of principles-based drafting in the .Australian context, see G. Pinder, TIle Coherent Principles
Approach to Tax Law Design, currently available at:· www.treasury.gov.auldoCll1nelltsI987IPDPI
07.uoherent.principles.pdf (accessed May 1,2008). . .
167' Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v The Qpeell [2005] 5 CTe 215; 2005 DTC 5523, sec at [29], citing
Hon. Michael H. Wilson, Minister of Finance, Explanatory Notes to Legislation Relating to Income
Tax anne 1988) at 464. '
168 Canada Trustco MortgageCov TheQpeen[2005] 5 eTC 215; 2005 DTC 5523, sec at [30].
169 Canada Trusteo Mortgage Cov TheQueen[2005] 5 CrC 215; 2005 DTC 5523, SCC at [57], suggesting
(at [58]) that this consideration is relevant only where the object, spirit and purpose of the statutory
provisions at issue specifically limit tax benefits to transactions with economic substance, For critical
assessments of this conclusion, see Duff(2006), fn.132 at 67; and Li, fn.-132 at 35. '
170 Canada Trusteo Mortgage Co v The QJlcen [2005] 5 CTC 215; 2005 DTC 5523, SCC at [13], stating
that "the Duke ofWestminster principle and the emphasis on textual interpretation may be attenuated."
171 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v Tlze Queen [2005] 5 CTC 215; 2005 DTC 5523, see at [1], declaring
that the ITA "continues to permit legitimate tax minimization" and that the task of the courts is "to
unite" the traditional approach with the GAAR in a manner that achieves "consistent, predictable and
fair results."
172 At the time of writing, the Supreme Court of Canada had just granted leave to appeal in another
GAAR case, involving the deduction of interest expenses on' borrowed funds used by one spouse to
purchase shares from the other spouse, who used' the proceeds from the sale of the shares to purchase
a home. Lipson v Canada, 2007 FCA 113; leave to appeal granted by the Supreme Court of Canada,
[2007] SCCA No. 248. The appeal was heard on Apri123, 2008 and the Court reserved its judgment.
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Conclusion
UK tax concepts have exerted ongoing influence in the development of Canadian income
tax law. This influence extends not only to the prevailing concept of incomein Canadian
income tax, but also, crucially, to judicial approaches to the interpretation of tax statutes
and tax avoidance. Withrespect to the concept of income, Canadian 'courts have been
influenced by UK source and trust concepts of income' 'as well as the schedular .nature
of the UK income tax. These influences have 'effectively disinclined Canadian judicial
decisions-with some rare exceptions, such as the-Supreme Court of Canada's decision
in Curran in 1959-from taking seriously a global' or accretion concept of income 'for
the purposes of the Canadian income tax. In response to judicial decisions .adopting a
narrower view of income under· the influence of these UK taxconcepts, the Canadian
income tax has often been amended to extend the breadth ofthe, tax. These amendments,
like the judicial decisions they have displaced, as well as subsequent judicial decisions' in
which they have been considered, remain as an enduring legacy of UK tax concepts in
Canadian income tax law. ,..,
With respect to interpretation and tax avoidance, Canadian courts originally adopted
the strict and literal approach that UK courts embraced from the mid-nineteenth century
to the 1970s as well as .the formalist approach to the characterisation of-transactions and
legal relationships that the House of Lords adopted in the Duke of Westminster case.
Although Canadian courts began to depart from this approach in the 1980s-~ith the
Supreme Court of Canada rejecting strict and literal interpretation inits 1984 decision in
Stubart Investments,173 and.embracinga more substantive approach to the characterisation
of transactions and relationships for, tax purposes in its '1987 decision, in Bronfman
Trust174-the legacy of strict and literal interpretation and formalistic characterisation
endures in the detailed and prolix manner in which income tax legislation is drafted, the
multitude ofprovisions designedto fill gaps created by restrictive judicial interpretations,
the variety of specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs) designed to limit opportunities,
and the existence of a statutory general-anti avoidance rule (GAAR) enacted in 1988.
Despite the Supreme Court of Canada's emphasis during the 1980s and early 1990s
on purposive interpretation and substantive characterisation, moreover, the traditional
judicial approach resurfaced from the mid-1990s to the 'early 2000s as the Supreme Court
of Canada adopted a more literal interpretative approach and a.more formalist approach
to the characterisation of transactions and relationships for tax purposes.. While more
recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions suggest a greater willingness to interpret tax
provisions in light of their context arid purpose, the traditional approach endures in a
continuing emphasis on textual interpretation oftax legislation and in 'a formalist approach
.to the application of the GAAR that seeks to "unite", the traditional Du~~ ojWestminster
principle with the very different approach intended by theGAAR. e:Y',' .
.173 Stubart Imiestments Ltd v Tlze Queen [1984]eTC 294; 84 DTC 6305"sec.
174 Bronfman Trust u The fhleell [1987] 1 eTC 117;87 DTC 5059,SCC.
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